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REVERSE PAYMENTS: WHEN THE 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION CAN 
ATTACK THE VALIDITY OF 
UNDERLYING PATENTS  
INTRODUCTION 
Settlements between brand-name and generic pharmaceutical 
companies that delay generic entry into the market are estimated to 
cost American consumers $35 billion over the next ten years.1 With 
spiraling healthcare costs and an aging population, the public deserves 
an explanation for the inordinate amount drug companies pay one 
another to stay off the market because the effects of this egregious 
conduct are ultimately passed on to them. In recent years, the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) has sought to protect consumers from these 
dubious payments by arguing they violate antitrust law but to no 
avail.2
These questionable agreements typically arise from patent in-
fringement cases between a brand-name pharmaceutical company and 
a generic drug producer. Under the provisions of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, a generic company can allege a brand-name’s patent is invalid or 
will not be infringed upon by the generic’s new drug when it seeks 
  
  
 1 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS 
COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 2 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/ 
100112payfordelayrpt.pdf. 
 2 See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065-66 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (The FTC argued the “reverse payments” were an illegal restraint of trade 
in violation of antitrust law. The court, however, found that neither the rule of reason 
or per se analysis was applicable, noting “both approaches [are] ill-suited for an anti-
trust analysis of patent cases because they seek to determine whether the challenged 
conduct had an anticompetitive effect on the market…. By their nature, patents can 
create an environment of exclusion, and consequently, cripple competition.”); In re 
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(upholding the district court’s finding that the agreement was not per se illegal and 
acknowledging that these types of agreements are within the patentee’s rights); In re 
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that 
settlements to protect the patent monopoly, without more, does not establish an anti-
trust violation). 
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approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).3 But prior to 
an FDA review of the generic’s application, a brand-name can elect to 
sue the generic if it believes the generic will infringe upon its own 
patent.4 To avoid the cost of litigation, parties usually settle; however, 
it is the patent holder, not the alleged infringer, who ultimately pays to 
settle. This practice is commonly known as providing a “reverse pay-
ment,” because the alleged infringer who normally pays to settle a 
case is being paid by the patent holder instead. In these agreements, 
the patent holder pays the generic ostensibly for the generic’s promise 
not to enter the market in order to protect its monopoly in the market.5 
These agreements are particularly problematic because the disputed 
patents may actually be invalid, an issue that is never debated, since a 
settlement is often reached prior to trial. This fear increases when one 
considers that from 1992 to 2002, generics prevailed in 73% of the 
patent infringement cases that were resolved by a court decision.6  
Because the frequency of these settlements continues to steadily in-
crease it is imperative to consider the legality of this behavior in order 
to protect those most affected by this–the consumers.7
In reviewing the most recent decisions involving “reverse pay-
ments,” where these settlements have been increasingly upheld, the 
need for the FTC to change its tactics becomes evident. Legal com-
mentators, though, have struggled to develop a better alternative to 
using antitrust laws to combat this practice. This Note proposes that 
the FTC stop working within the traditional antitrust framework and 
force the pharmaceutical companies to justify that these agreements 
  
  
 3 See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 
(Hatch-Waxman Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat 1585 (1984) (codified as amended 
at 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (West 2010)). 
 4 Id. 
 5 See In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 988 (2003) (“If there has 
been a payment from the patent holder to the generic challenger, there must have been 
some offsetting consideration. Absent proof of other offsetting consideration, it is 
logical to conclude that the quid pro quo for the payment was an agreement by the 
generic to defer entry beyond the date that represents an otherwise reasonable litiga-
tion compromise.”). 
 6 FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT  
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 8 (2002), available at  http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/ 
genericdrugstudy.pdf. 
 7 See BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FTC, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, 
IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS FILED 
IN FY 2008 8 fig.3 (2010) [hereinafter FTC SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100113mpdim2003rpt.pdf (summarizing settlements 
filed with the FTC and revealing a steady increase from zero settlements restricting 
generic entry and compensation the generic in 2004 to sixteen settlements of this 
nature in 2008). 
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are within the scope of its patent rights. Specifically, this Note argues 
that the FTC has standing to challenge the validity of the underlying 
patent and should challenge the brand-name’s patent when it charges 
these companies with antitrust violations. The Supreme Court has 
long recognized that the Government has a duty to protect the public 
from anticompetitive behavior and has extended this duty by allowing 
the Government to challenge a patent when the patent holder was 
charged with violating antitrust law.8 Based upon this precedent and 
considering that the FTC’s Competition Bureau is the government 
agency that currently investigates antitrust violations in the pharma-
ceutical industry,9
  
 8 See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 388 (1948) 
(“In a suit to vindicate the public interest by enjoining violations of the Sherman Act, 
the United States should have the…opportunity to show that the asserted shield of 
patentability does not exist.”); United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 57-58 
(1973) (finding the Government has authority to “raise and litigate the validity 
of…patents in [an] antitrust case.”). 
 9 See generally Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust 
Implications of Patent Settlements: Hearing Before the S. Comm on the Judiciary, 
107th Cong. (2001) (statement of James M. Griffin, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. 
Antitrust Division) (describing the shared responsibility of the Department of Justice 
and Federal Trade Commission to investigate “reverse payment” agreements). 
 the FTC should have the ability to challenge pa-
tents involved in these settlements. 
Part I provides a background of Hatch-Waxman Act. Part II pro-
vides an introduction to the basic approaches to antitrust violations: 
the per se and rule of reason analyses. Part III discusses various ap-
proaches taken by the courts in recent years when dealing with “re-
verse payments,” while part IV provides an overview of the current 
academic debate about these settlements. Part V discusses case law 
that supports the conclusion that the Government has the standing to 
challenge the underlying patent involved in these suspect settlements 
and details how this power can be an effective tool in preventing ab-
usive pharmaceutical settlements.  
Ultimately, this Note offers a novel approach for the FTC to use 
in its fight against “reverse payments.” By sidestepping the debate 
over how these payments should be treated (i.e., per se illegal or rea-
sonable under the rule of reason), the FTC can avoid current judicial 
opinion and does not have to wait for Congress to enact legislation 
prohibiting these payments. Instead, the FTC can ensure these agree-
ments do not abuse the exclusionary scope of the patent by forcing the 
pharmaceutical companies to prove their patents are valid.  
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I. REGULATORY BACKGROUND: SUMMARY OF THE 
HATCH -WAXMAN ACT AND AMENDMENTS 
In 1984, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition & Patent 
Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly known as the Hatch-
Waxman Act.10 The idea behind the Act was to make the pharmaceut-
ical market more competitive by facilitating the ability of generics to 
enter the market, in particular by changing the FDA approval re-
quirements for generics.11 Prior to 1984, every single drug company 
who wanted to release a new drug, brand-name or generic, had to file 
a new drug application (“NDA”).12 An NDA requires each applicant 
to submit safety and efficacy studies, list the components of the drug, 
describe the methods used in manufacturing the drug and the 
“processing and packaging” of the drug, and disclose any patents is-
sued relating to the drug.13 Thus, prior to 1984, generics had to submit 
their own safety and efficacy studies even if similar studies had been 
performed for drugs comprised of the same ingredients.14 However, a 
generic could not even begin performing drug trials until after the 
relevant patent on the brand-name drug had expired or it risked being 
sued for patent infringement by a brand-name.15 This effectively ex-
tended the life of the original pharmaceutical patent beyond its term. 
Therefore in order to facilitate access to the drug market, the Hatch-
Waxman Act created an abbreviated new drug application 
(“ANDA”).16
  
 10 Pub. L. No 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.A. § 
355 (West 2010)). 
 11 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt.1, at 14-15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647-48.  
 12 See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 190-92 (2d Cir. 
2006) (explaining the NDA process and the availability of the ANDA post-1984 to 
facilitate generic market entry); see also Erica N. Andersen, Schering the Market: 
Analyzing the Debate Over Reverse-Payment Settlements in the Wake of the Medicare 
Modernization Act of 2003 and In re Tamoxifen Citrate Litigation, 93 IOWA L. REV. 
1015, 1018-19 (2008). Today, brand-name companies making an initial market entry 
still have to file an NDA under 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). 
 13 § 355(b)(1) (requirements of an NDA). 
 14 See Schering Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 n.2 (11th Cir. 
2005) (describing the purpose and effect of the addition of the ANDA to the Hatch-
Waxman Act).  
 15 Prior to 1984, the generic may have been liable under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) 
(2006); however, the Hatch-Waxman Act created a safe-harbor provision for this 
practice in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006). See Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, 
Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 195-96 (2005). 
 16 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j) (West 2010).  
 This application differs from the traditional NDA be-
cause it allows the generics to take advantage of prior safety and effi-
cacy studies conducted so long as the manufacturer can prove that the 
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generic is bio-equivalent to the brand-name.17 Additionally, the Act 
amended what constitutes patent infringement in order to allow safety 
and efficacy testing of generics before the expiration of the brand-
name drug patent.18
Under the Act, an ANDA filer must certify that to the best of its 
knowledge that the generic does not infringe on any patent listed with 
the FDA.
 
19 The filer can assert: (1) the “patent information has not 
been filed” on the generic’s bio-equivalent (Paragraph I certification); 
(2) a “patent [on a bio-equivalent] has expired” (Paragraph II certifi-
cation); (3) a patent exists however the generic will not market the 
drug until after the date “such patent will expire” (Paragraph III certi-
fication); or (4) “such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the 
manufacture, use, or sale of the new [generic] drug for which the ap-
plication is submitted” (Paragraph IV certification).20 If the generic 
filing the ANDA makes a Paragraph IV certification, it is required to 
notify each NDA holder or patent holder affected by its ANDA certi-
fication within twenty days of filing, at which point the brand-name 
drug company has forty-five days to decide if it wants to sue for in-
fringement.21 If the NDA or patent holder decides to file suit, then an 
automatic thirty-month stay goes into effect during which the FDA is 
not allowed to approve the generic unless a court determines the pa-
tent is invalid or not infringed before the stay ends.22 To compensate 
for the delay in FDA approval, the first entity to file an ANDA appli-
cation is automatically entitled to a 180-day period of exclusivity.23 
This period begins after the first commercial marketing of the drug, 
during which the FDA agrees not to approve any subsequent ANDA 
applications.24
  
 17 Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1058-59 n.2 (“The Hatch-Waxman’s 
truncated procedure avoids the duplication of expensive safety and efficacy studies, 
so long as the generic manufacturer proves that the drug is bio-equivalent to the al-
ready-approved brand-name/pioneer drug.”). 
 18 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (safe harbor provision).  
 19 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii). 
 20 § 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii)(I-IV). 
 21 § 355(j)(2)(B) (notice requirements); § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (timeline for filing 
an infringement action). 
 22 § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 23 § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 24 See id. (indicating that the exclusivity period only applies to the “first 
applicant” after the “first commercial marketing of the drug”); see also Michael A. 
Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive Illegality, 
108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 47 n.62 (2009) (discussing how prior to 2003 the Hatch-
Waxman Act contained a “second trigger” for the exclusivity period with a final court 
decision). 
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Concerned with abuses stemming from the original Hatch-
Waxman Act, Congress enacted the Medicare Prescription Drug, Im-
provement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (Medicare Act).25 For 
example prior to the revision, a brand-name drug company, in theory, 
could obtain an unlimited number of thirty-month stays. A brand-
name would obtain these multiple stays by first listing other patents 
relating to its drug with the FDA after the generic filed its ANDA. 
Once its first thirty-month stay ended, the brand-name would allege 
the generic potentially infringed one of these newly listed patents, 
allowing the brand-name to enjoy another thirty-month stay. Using 
this strategy, GlaxoSmithKline was able to prevent generic companies 
from competing against its antidepressant drug Paxil for more than 
five years.26 Congress addressed this issue in the Medicare Act by 
limiting thirty-month stays to patents on file with the FDA before the 
ANDA was submitted.27
The Medicare Act also sought to curb the abuse of the 180-day 
exclusivity period by ensuring that a generic company who was 
granted the period either used it or was forced to forfeit it.
  
28 For ex-
ample, a generic would be forced to forfeit the exclusivity period if it: 
(1) failed to market the drug within seventy-five days of FDA approv-
al; (2) failed to market the drug within seventy-five days of a final 
judgment finding the patent invalid or not infringed; (3) withdrew its 
application; (4) failed to obtain tentative FDA approval within thirty 
months after the application was initially filed; or (5) entered an 
agreement with another applicant or patent holder that violated anti-
trust laws.29 This amendment was designed to prevent the bottlenecks 
that could occur if the first filer of an ANDA took actions to avoid 
triggering its exclusivity period, which would prevent other generics 
from entering the market until the first-filing generic’s exclusivity 
period expired.30
Finally, the amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act also required 
the patent holder and first paragraph VI ANDA filer who reach a set-
tlement during litigation to file the agreement with the FTC and the 
 
  
 25 Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 21, 26, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 26 See Carrier, supra note 24, at 47-48 (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC 
DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 51 (2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf). 
 27 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); see Carrier, supra note 24, at 48. 
 28 See § 355(j)(5)(D); see also Carrier, supra note 24, at 48 (discussing the 
various forfeiture events provided by the statute to curb the abuse of the 180 day 
exclusivity period). 
 29 Carrier, supra note 24, at 48 (citing § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)). 
 30 Id. at 49. 
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DOJ within ten days of entering into the agreement.31 Arguably, this 
requirement would make it easier for the FTC and DOJ to review the 
agreements to verify they did not violate antitrust law.32
While a patent allows its holder to “exclude others from making, 
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention,”
 
II. APPROACHES TO ANTITRUST LAW 
33 the Government 
and private entities argue that “reverse payments” between pharma-
ceutical companies go beyond the scope of a patent and are illegal 
restraints of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.34 The Sherman Act 
states that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or oth-
erwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”35 The 
Supreme Court has interpreted this prohibition as only applying to 
unreasonable restraints of trade.36 In determining whether there is an 
unreasonable restraint of trade, courts will apply either the per se rule 
or the rule of reason analysis.37 Despite the existence of two ap-
proaches, courts generally apply the rule of reason analysis,38 reserv-
ing the per se rule for agreements that have a “predictable and perni-
cious anticompetitive effect, and such limited potential for precompe-
titive benefit.”39
To find an agreement per se illegal, a court must have adequate 
experience with the conduct described and be able to find it yields 




 31 § 355 (j)(5)(D)(i)(V); see also Carrier, supra note 24, at 48. 
 32 See Carrier, supra note 24, at 48 (discussing how the Hatch-Waxman Act 
was designed to prevent secret agreements and how the Medicare Act amendments 
sought to support this objective through required disclosure). 
 33 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).  
 34 See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005); 
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In 
re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 35 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 36 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“Although the Sherman 
Act, by its terms, prohibits every agreement ‘in restraint of trade,’ this Court has long 
recognized that Congress intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints.”) (citation 
omitted).  
 37 Id. 
 38 Id.; see also Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (noting that the 
rule of reason “presumptively applies”).  
 39 State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 10. 
 If a court deter-
 40 Id. (“Per se treatment is appropriate ‘[o]nce experience with a particular 
kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason 
will condemn it.’” (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 
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mines that the disputed conduct is per se illegal, it can simply con-
demn the restraint of trade without an inquiry into the defendant’s 
market power, the actual anticompetitive effects of the conduct, or the 
reasons for the conduct.41 The Supreme Court, however, has ex-
pressed concerns over applying the per se analysis, since it “require[s] 
the Court to make broad generalizations about the social utility of 
particular commercial practices.”42 If there are too many per se viola-
tions, there is a risk that the law will become too rigid and prevent 
courts from considering the facts in future cases.43 Therefore, the per 
se rule generally applies only to a few types of conduct, such as price 
fixing, tying agreements, and “naked” exit payments (made only to 
keep a potential competitor from entering the market).44
If a court is unable to find such pernicious conduct, it instead ap-
plies the rule of reason analysis.
 
45 Under the rule of reason, “the find-
er of fact must decide whether the questioned practice imposes an 
unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of 
factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its 
condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the re-
straint’s history, nature, and effect.”46 The plaintiff has the initial bur-
den of demonstrating that the defendants have “market power” in a 
particular market and that their alleged conduct produced adverse, 
anticompetitive effects within the relevant market.47 If the plaintiff is 
able to demonstrate such effects, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
justify the conduct by explaining how it is pro-competitive.48
  
344 (1982)); see also In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., No. 01-1652, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11756, at *52 (D. N.J. Feb. 4, 2009). 
 41 In re K-Dur, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11756, at *52; see also Herbert Ho-
venkamp, Sensible Antitrust Rules for Pharmaceutical Competition, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 
11, 20 (2004) (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984)).  
 42 Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977). 
 43 Id. (“Once established, per se rules tend to provide guidance to the busi-
ness community and to minimize the burdens on litigants and the judicial system…, 
but those advantages are not sufficient in themselves to justify the creation of per se 
rules. If it were otherwise, all of antitrust law would be reduced to per se rules, thus 
introducing an unintended and undesirable rigidity in the law.”). 
 44 See State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 11 (price fixing as per se illegal); NCAA, 
468 U.S. at 100 (“Horizontal price fixing and output limitation are ordinarily con-
demned as a matter of law under an ‘illegal per se’ approach because the probability 
that these practices are anticompetitive is so high….”); Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 
20 (discussing the illegality of price fixing, tying agreements, and exit payments).  
 45 See State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 10.  
 46 Id. 
 47 United States v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 If the 
 48 Id. For instance, a pro-competitive justification may include benefits the 
consumers by reducing marginal costs or increased efficiency of production. See 
Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law? 42 U.C. DAVIS 
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defendant is able to provide a reasonable explanation for its conduct, 
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate either that the 
objectives of the conduct can be achieved in a less restrictive manner 
or that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve the pro-
competitive objectives.49 Essentially, the rule of reason analysis asks 
the trier of fact to weigh the harms and benefits of the challenged 
conduct to determine if it broadly promotes or hurts competition.50
In relation to pharmaceutical settlements, courts have applied both 
the per se and the rule of reason analysis.
 
51
Recently, there has been an influx of antitrust cases filed against 
brand-name pharmaceutical companies and generics over patent set-
tlements, which according to the FTC and consumer groups should be 
considered illegal restraints of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.
 The disagreement among 
courts and commentators on how to treat these settlements stems from 
the tension between antitrust and patent law. Patents are designed to 
grant the holder a legal monopoly, which seems in direct conflict with 
the goals of antitrust law, but a patent monopoly is not absolute. Thus, 
the courts must decide whether these settlements are a legal exercise 
of the rights granted by a patent or if they go beyond this scope. 




L. REV. 1375, 1385 (2009). However, “[a] restraint on competition cannot be justified 
solely on the basis of social welfare concerns.” Schering-Plough, Corp. v. FTC, 402 
F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 49 Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d at 238. 
 50 Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 
537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 
238 (1918) (“The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as mere-
ly regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may 
suppress or even destroy competition.”)).  
 51 See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 
1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (upholding the district court’s decision the agreement 
was legal under the rule of reason analysis); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig. (Car-
dizem CD III), 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003) (ruling the agreement was per se 
illegal). 
 52 See, e.g., See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1061 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (FTC argued that that the ESI agreement violated Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride, 544 F.3d at 1340 (holding that the settle-
ment agreements did not violate the Sherman Act and that all anticompetitive effects 
were within the exclusionary power of the ‘444 patent); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Anti-
trust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 190 (2d Cir. 2006) (plaintiffs argued that the settlement was 
an agreement to monopolize the market for Tamoxifen). 
 Initially, the courts were more receptive to the arguments arti-
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culated by the FTC and consumer groups, but courts have increasingly 
ruled in favor of these agreements.53
In the first case ruling against “reverse payments,” In re Cardi-
zem, the Sixth Circuit determined that the agreement between Hoescht 
Marion Rouseel, Inc. (HMR) and Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was 
per se illegal under the Sherman Act.
 
A. In re Cardizem 
54 HMR manufactured Cardizem 
CD, a drug used to treat angina and to prevent heart attacks and 
strokes, under a license granted by Carderm Capital, the patent hold-
er.55 In 1996, HMR, in conjunction with Carderm, filed suit against 
Andrx, claiming its generic would infringe upon Carderm’s new pa-
tent, which covered the drug’s method of release in the body.56 The 
two parties came to an agreement in 1997, after the FDA had tenta-
tively approved Andrx’ ANDA.57 The approval would have allowed 
Andrx to enter the market once the court ruled that Carderm’s patent 
was not infringed or the thirty-month waiting period had elapsed.58 In 
exchange for delaying the release of Andrx’s generic until a determi-
nation on infringement, HMR agreed to pay $40 million a year.59 If 
Andrx received final FDA approval, the payment would increase to 
$100 million if it was determined the patent was not infringed.60 Ad-
ditionally, Andrx agreed to prosecute its ANDA, securing its 180-day 
period of exclusivity granted by the Hatch-Waxman Act.61
In July 1998, the FDA issued its final approval of Andrx’s 
ANDA, which prompted HMR to increase its payments to Andrx (as 




 53 See discussion infra. 
 54 Cardizem CD III, 332 F.3d at 908 (“There is simply no escaping the con-
clusion that the Agreement…was, at its core, a horizontal agreement to eliminate 
competition in the market for Cardizem CD throughout the entire United States, a 
classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.”). 
 55 Id. at 901-02. 
 56 Id. at 902. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 903. 
 61 Id. at 902. This strategy is no longer permissible under the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, which provides that a company cannot hold onto its 180-day exclusivity period if 
it fails to market the drug within a specified time period after final FDA approval. See 
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i) (2006); Carrier, supra note 24, at 48-49.  
 62 Id. 
 
Meanwhile, in hopes of avoiding further litigation, Andrx amended its 
ANDA to seek approval for a reformulated version, which it thought 
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did not infringe Carderm’s patent.63 The FDA approved the new ver-
sion in 1999 and the two parties decided to end their agreement and 
settle the infringement case.64 In total, HMR paid Andrx $89.83 mil-
lion ($50.7 final settlement payment plus prior payments under the 
agreement) after which, Andrx began to market its generic and, not 
surprisingly, obtained a substantial share of the market.65
Ignoring the argument that the arrangement was within HMR’s 
rights as the patent holder, the court ruled the agreement was per se 
illegal.
 
66 Because HMR paid its only known potential competitor to 
stay off the market, the court found the agreement was analogous to a 
“horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the market,” which 
is always treated as per se illegal.67 This conclusion was supported by 
the fact the agreement delayed the entry of other generics into the 
market since Andrx possessed the 180-day exclusivity period granted 
to the first generic to file an ANDA.68 The court noted that it is one 
thing to use the legal monopoly granted by the patent, but it is another 
to silence all potential competitors by “paying the only potential com-
petitor $40 million per year to stay out of the market.”69
In Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals Inc., the first ma-
jor case in the Eleventh Circuit concerning “reverse payments,” the 
court refused to follow the Sixth Circuit and rule “reverse payment” 
agreements were per se illegal.
 Therefore, 
despite the traditional patent rights granted to the holder, the court 
ruled that this agreement was a per se illegal restraint of trade.  
B. Valley Drug/Schering-Plough 
70 Instead, the court noted that “reverse 
payments” may be a permissible exercise of the patent holder’s rights 
and thus, they cannot be held to the per se illegal standard.71
  
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 908. 
 67 Id.; see United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (de-
scribing how “horizontal territorial agreements” cannot have pro-competitive objec-
tives). 
 68 See Cardizem CD III, 332 F.3d at 907. The agreement by Andrx to contin-
ue to seek its ANDA effectively meant that other generics could not enter the market 
until the 180 days expired. Id. 
 69 Id. at 908. 
 70 Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F. 3d 1294, 1310-11 (11th 
Cir. 2003).  
 71 Id. 
 At issue 
were agreements made between Abbott Laboratories and two generic 
companies that prevented the generics from entering the market.  
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Abbott manufactures Hytrin (active ingredient: dihydrate terazo-
sin hydrochloride), which is used to treat hypertension and enlarged 
prostate.72 Originally, Abbott held a patent on the major chemical 
compound in the drug, but it subsequently obtained patents covering 
different forms and uses of the drug.73 From 1993-1996, Geneva filed 
six ANDAs based on Hytrin, each time making paragraph IV certifi-
cations with respect to the listed patents.74 During the same time pe-
riod, Zenith also filed an ANDA, making a paragraph IV certification 
to Abbott’s Hytrin patent.75
In 1998, Abbott and Zenith entered into an agreement, where Ab-
bott agreed to pay Zenith $3 million up front, $3 million after three 
months, and $6 million every three months until March 1, 2000 or 
until the agreement terminated for another reason.
 As a result, Abbott filed an infringement 
suit against both Geneva and Zenith.  
76 In exchange, Ze-
nith agreed not to sell or transfer its rights under any ANDA relating 
to a terzosin hydrochloride drug. Zenith also agreed not to aid anyone 
in gaining FDA approval for such drug or to aid anyone in opposing 
or invalidating Abbott’s patents relating to Hytrin. Lastly, Zenith 
agreed not to sell or distribute any drug containing terazosin hydroch-
loride until Abbott’s patent expired or another generic introduced a 
drug containing the compound.77
In 1998, Abbott and Geneva entered into a similar agreement, 
where Geneva could not sell or distribute any “pharmaceutical prod-
uct” containing terazosin hydrochloride until Abbott’s patent expired, 
another company introduced a generic form, or Geneva was success-
ful in demonstrating that its product did not infringe Abbott’s patents 
or proving Abbott’s patent was invalid.
 
78 In return, Abbott agreed to 
pay Geneva $4.5 million each month until another company intro-
duced a generic form of terazosin hydrochloride or Abbott won a fa-
vorable result the infringement claim against Geneva.79
Several various private drug companies sued Abbott, Geneva and 





 72 Id. at 1298. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 1299.  
 76 Id. at 1300. 
 77 Id. (detailing the settlement agreement between Abbott and Zenith). 
 78 Id. Geneva also agreed as part of the settlement to not sell or transfer its 
rights under its ANDA. Id.  
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 1301; see 15 U.S.C. §1 (2006). 
 The District Court ruled that the agreements were per se viola-
tions of § 1 of the Sherman Act and granted partial summary judg-
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ments to the plaintiffs.81 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, 
finding that the agreements were not per se illegal because one of the 
parties owned a patent.82 Since a patent grants the holder a legal mo-
nopoly, creating a settlement excluding generics from the market was 
considered within the patent holder’s rights.83 Although the size of the 
settlement payment did cast suspicion on the patent’s validity, the 
court would not conclude simply from the size of the payment that the 
agreement was made in bad faith.84 The Eleventh Circuit refused to 
follow the Sixth Circuit in finding these payments were per se illegal 
because in its opinion the Sixth Circuit failed to adequately consider 
the “exclusionary power of the patent.”85
In Schering-Plough v. FTC, the Eleventh Circuit went even fur-
ther to describe its stance on “reverse payments,” arguing that neither 
the rule of reason nor per se analysis is appropriate when deciding if 
such payments violate antitrust law.
 
86 In 2001, the FTC filed a com-
plaint alleging that the settlements between Schering-Plough and two 
generic manufacturers, Upsher-Smith and Schering-Plough and ESI 
Lederle, Inc. (ESI), violated antitrust law.87
Upsher-Smith had filed with the FDA to gain approval on its ge-
neric version of Schering-Plough’s K-Dur 20, a supplement taken in 
conjunction with other prescriptions for the treatment of high blood 
pressure or congestive heart disease.
  
88 During the patent infringement 
action, Schering-Plough and Upsher-Smith reached a settlement 
where Schering-Plough agreed to license other Upsher products in 
exchange for Upsher agreeing to delay its entry into the market until 
September 2001.89 Similarly, ESI sought FDA approval of its own 
generic version of K-Dur 20, which prompted Schering-Plough to file 
an infringement suit.90
  
 81 See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 
1354 (S.D. Fla. 2000).  
 82 Valley Drug Co., 344 F. 3d at 1306.  
 83 Id. at 1304-05 (describing the scope of the patent holder’s rights and the 
inherent market effect of such rights). 
 84 Id. at 1309-10. The court did not know what factors, such as lost profits 
expected from generic competition, the generics’ expected profits, or expected sav-
ings in litigation costs, went into determining the size of the payment. Without this 
knowledge, the court could not conclude that the size of the payment reflected the 
patentee’s belief that the patent was invalid. Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 87 Id. at 1061. 
 88 Id. at 1058. 
 89 Id. at 1059. 
 90 Id. at 1060. 
 As part of the settlement, Schering-Plough 
agreed to pay ESI $5 million for legal fees, to allow ESI to enter the 
50 JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET [Vol. 2:1 
market three years before its patent expired, and to pay an additional 
$10 million if the FDA approved ESI’s application.91 In exchange, 
ESI agreed to remain off the market and granted Schering-Plough 
licenses on its own drug patents.92
Subsequently, the FTC filed an administrative complaint against 
all three companies, alleging that the settlements violated Section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) and Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.
 
93 After an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found these 
settlements to be lawful, the FTC appealed to the full Commission.94 
The Commission overruled the ALJ, finding the payments to be illeg-
al because “the quid pro quo for the payment was an agreement to 
defer the entry dates, and…such delay would injure competition and 
consumers.”95 The Eleventh Circuit reversed the Commission, finding 
that there was not enough evidence to support the conclusion that the 
settlements violated the Sherman and FTC Acts.96 In doing so, how-
ever, it rejected both the per se and rule of reason analysis typically 
applied in antitrust cases, finding that both approaches were ill-suited 
to determine the antitrust liabilities of a patent holder.97 It noted that 
because of “their nature, patents create an environment of exclusions, 
and consequently, cripple competition” and thus, an “anticompetitive 
effect is already present.”98 The court proposed to determine antitrust 
liability by examining: “(1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of 
the patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed that scope; 
and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects.”99 Applying its own 
standard, the court found that the agreements did not exceed the scope 
of that patent and the anticompetitive effects of the settlement were 
far outweighed by the benefits, especially considering the potential 
negative effects caustic patent litigation may have on innovation.100
In In re Tamoxifen, the Second Circuit considered a “reverse 
payment” settlement between Zeneca and Barr, involving the drug 
  
C. In re Tamoxifen 
  
 91 Id. at 1060-61. 
 92 Id. at 1061. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 1062. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 1071-72. 
 97 Id. at 1065.  
 98 Id. at 1065-66. 
 99 Id. at 1066 (citing Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm. Inc., 344 F. 3d 1294, 
1312 (11th Cir. 2003)). 
 100 See id. at 1075. 
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tamoxifen, which is the most prescribed breast cancer drug.101 Unlike 
prior cases, the district court had already invalidated the tamoxifen 
patent before the two parties reached an agreement.102 However, be-
cause the judgment was never affirmed, the Second Circuit did not 
speculate as to the ultimate resolution of the issue and it declined to 
consider the district court’s finding of invalidity as part of its analy-
sis.103 The court ultimately found that the agreements were not per se 
illegal and were, in fact, legal.104
Immediately after the United States Patent & Trademark Office 
(USPTO) issued the patent in 1985 to Imperial Chemical Industries, 
PLC, (“ICI”), Barr filed an ANDA with the FDA based on its generic 
version of tamoxifen.
  
105 Barr amended its application in 1987 to in-
clude a paragraph IV certification, which prompted ICI to file an in-
fringement suit against Barr and its raw material supplier.106 At trial, 
the district court invalidated ICI’s patent because the company with-
held crucial information from the USPTO during patent prosecu-
tion.107
The agreement restricted Barr from marketing its generic until af-
ter the expiration of Zeneca’s patent in 2002 and required Barr to 
amend its ANDA to a Paragraph III certification in exchange for $21 
million and a non-exclusive license to market Zeneca-manufactured 
tamoxifen under its own label.
 The decision was appealed but before the appeal was consi-
dered, the two sides agreed to settle.  
108 Additionally, if Zeneca’s patent was 
invalidated, Barr would be allowed to revert its ANDA certification to 
a Paragraph IV certification.109
  
 101 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 102 Id. at 202. 
 103 Id. at 204-05.  
 104 Id. at 206. In so holding, the Second Circuit considered Valley Drug Co. v. 
Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F. 3d 1294, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003), where the Eleventh 
Circuit found the mere existence of a reverse payment is not enough to assert an anti-
trust violation and Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 
(N.D. Ill. 2003), where the court argued that banning reverse payments would disin-
centive a patent challenger by limiting settlement options. 
 105 In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F.3d at 193. Zeneca is a former subsidiary of 
ICI, which succeeded to the rights of the tamoxifen patent.  
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. (ICI withheld tests that revealed opposite desired hormonal effects than 
those “sought in humans,” which could have “unpredictable and at times disastrous 
consequences.” (citing Imperial Chem. Indus., PLC v. Barr Labs., 795 F.Supp. 619, 
622 (S.D.N.Y 1992)). 
 108 Id. at 193-94. Barr’s raw material supplier was also paid $9.5 million 
upfront and $35.9 million over the course of ten years. Id. at 194. 
 109 Id. at 194. 
 Pursuant to the settlement, the parties 
moved to vacate the district court’s judgment, which was granted by 
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the Federal Circuit.110 Subsequently, three other generic companies 
challenged Zeneca’s patent; however none were successful, partly 
because they could not rely on the prior finding of invalidity.111   In 
2005, consumer groups challenged the validity of the agreement be-
tween Zeneca and Barr, alleging that the agreement was illegal be-
cause it: (i) allowed the two parties to “resuscitate” a patent that was 
held to be invalid and unenforceable; (ii) allowed Zeneca to continue 
its monopoly in the tamoxifen market; (iii) allowed the two to share in 
the profits of its continued monopoly; (iv) maintained a high price for 
the drug; and (v) prevented competition from other generic compa-
nies.112 According to the plaintiffs, if the settlement had not occurred, 
then Barr would have likely prevailed in the infringement suit and 
gained FDA approval to market its generic.113 FDA approval would 
have then triggered the 180-day exclusivity period, ultimately allow-
ing other generics to enter the market years before the patent’s expira-
tion and this earlier market entry would have driven prices below the 
levels which existed during the term of agreement.114
The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling, finding that 
the settlement was legal.
 
115 It emphasized the importance of encourag-
ing settlement between parties and explained that a ruling against the 
settlement had the potential to chill innovation.116 The court also re-
fused to believe the plaintiffs’ assumption that the invalidity of the 
patent would have been affirmed, stating that “[w]e cannot guess with 
any degree of assurance what the Federal Circuit would have done on 
an appeal from the district court’s judgment in Tamoxifen I.”117
The court also considered whether excessive payments—those 
that exceed the value a generic could have realized if it entered the 




 110 Id. While at the time considered legal, the Supreme Court has subsequent-
ly held that a vacatur like in this case is invalid in nearly all circumstances. See U.S. 
Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 27-29 (1994).  
 111 In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F.3d. at 194-95 (noting challenges from 
Novopharm Ltd., Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and Pharmachemie, B.V.).  
 112 Id. at 196-97.  
 113 Id. at 197.  
 114 Id.  
 115 Id. at 213-16 (discussing how various portions of the settlement agreement 
were not unlawful). 
 116 Id. at 203. If patent law becomes more uncertain, then those willing to 
innovate would be less likely to do so out of fear that their investment would not be 
rewarded. See id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 208. 
 Unlike other 
courts, which only considered whether the payments themselves were 
illegal, the Second Circuit went a step further and found that even 
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“excessive” payments were “not necessarily unlawful.”119 It noted that 
while it may seem suspicious when a generic manufacturer receives a 
windfall payment for not competing, such suspicion is unfounded.120 
So long as the litigation was not meritless or made in bath faith, a 
patentee is allowed to protect his patent, even if this means paying a 
future competitor to settle an infringement case.121 The court did not 
see the value in setting limits for these payments, since it would inhi-
bit the ability to settle122 and thus, it concluded that the settlement was 
not a restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.123
The disputed settlement in In re Ciprofloxacin involved Bayer, a 
brand-name pharmaceutical company, and Barr, a generic manufac-
turer.
 
D. In re Ciprofloxacin 
124 Bayer had a patent for the active ingredient, ciprofloxacin 
hydrochloride, in its drug Cipro used to treat bacterial infections, 
which was due to expire in 2003.125 In 2001, Barr filed an ANDA for 
its own version of Cipro, including a Paragraph IV certification.126 
After receiving notice of Barr’s ANDA, Bayer filed suit, at which 
point Barr made a side agreement with HMR to help fund its litigation 
costs in exchange for half of any future profits realized from Barr’s 
sale of its generic.127 Prior to trial, the three parties came to an agree-
ment. Barr agreed to change its ANDA from a Paragraph VI to a Pa-
ragraph III, thereby certifying that it would not enter the market until 
the expiration of Bayer’s patent in exchange for $49.1 million.128 Ad-
ditionally, Bayer agreed to pay Barr quarterly payments or supply 
Barr with Cipro for resale until the end of 2003 in exchange for Barr 
promising not to manufacture its generic version.129
  
 119 Id. at 213. 
 120 Id. at 208. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 211 (“Such a rule would…fail to give sufficient consideration to the 
patent holder’s incentive to settle the lawsuit without reference to the amount the 
generic manufacturer might earn in a competitive market, even when it is relatively 
confident of the validity of its patent—to insure against the possibility that its confi-
dence is misplaced….”). 
 123 Id. at 218. 
 124 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008).  
 125 Id. at 1328. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 1328-29.  
 129 Id. at 1329 (“Under the…Agreement, Bayer agreed to either supply Barr 
with Cipro for resale or to make quarterly payments (referred to as ‘reverse payments’ 
or ‘exclusion payments’)….”). 
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Beginning in 2000, purchasers of Cipro and advocacy groups filed 
antitrust suits arguing that these agreements were illegal.130 The dis-
trict court found that these agreements did not violate the Sherman 
Act.131 Applying the rule of reason test, it determined that ciproflox-
acin was the relevant market and that while Bayer did have market 
power, the anticompetitive effects of the agreement were within the 
scope of its patent; and therefore there could be no unreasonable re-
straint of trade.132
On appeal, the Federal Circuit upheld the agreements as legal and 
summarized the approaches taken by the Second and Eleventh Cir-
cuits, stating that in these types of cases it did not matter whether a 
court started by analyzing the issue under antitrust or patent law.
  
133 It 
found that, consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence, both the 
Second and Eleventh Circuits had recognized that “[t]he essence of 
the inquiry [was] whether the agreements restrict competition beyond 
the exclusionary zone of the patent.”134 The Federal Circuit agreed 
with this approach and also found that the validity of the patent, in the 
absence of fraud or sham litigation, need not be considered in order to 
assess the need to settle the infringement suit.135
In this case, Bayer simply exercised its right to prevent Barr from 
profiting from its patented invention, therefore the settlement did not 
run afoul with antitrust laws. The Federal Circuit distinguished In re 
Cardizem, where the agreements were found to be per se illegal, be-
cause in Cardizem the generic manufacturer did not relinquish its 180-
day exclusivity period, which completely prevented other generics 




 130 Id. The challenges were consolidated in the Eastern District of New York 
in 2001. 
 131 Id. at 1330. 
 132 Id. 
 133 See id. at 1335-36 (In discussing In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 
466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006) and Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm. Inc., 344 F. 3d 
1294 (11th Cir. 2003), the court noted that “in cases…wherein all anticompetitive 
effects of the settlement agreement are within the exclusionary power of the patent, 
the outcome is the same whether the court begins its analysis under antitrust law…or 
under patent law by analyzing the right to exclude afforded by the patent.”). 
 134 Id. at 1336; see Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. 
Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 175-77 (1965) (recognizing the legal monopoly granted by pa-
tents). 
 135 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride, 544 F.3d at 1336-37. 
 136 Id. at 1335. 
 In the Federal Circuit’s opinion, this was 
a clear example of anti-competitive effects falling outside the scope of 
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a patent.137 Bayer’s agreement did not go beyond the scope of its pa-
tent and thus the settlement did not violate of the Sherman Act.138
Today there is a litany of different approaches to the “reverse 
payment” dilemma. Some advocate treating these agreements as per 
se illegal or, in the alternative, illegal if the settlements greatly exceed 
potential litigation costs.
 
IV. CURRENT ACADEMIC VIEWS 
139 Conversely, others favor any patent set-
tlement provided that the infringement suit was not filed in bad 
faith.140 In trying to forge a middle ground, some have suggested 
creating a rebuttable presumption of illegality while others favor ap-
plying the antitrust rule of reason analysis, but with some caveats.141 
Each approach has its downfalls and without a Supreme Court deci-
sion or legislative action the debate continues.142
In support of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in In re Cardizem, a few 
commentators have called for all “reverse payments” to be declared 
per se illegal.
  
A. Per se Illegal Treatment 
143 To allay concerns that this will negatively affect in-
novation and development of new products in several industries at 
least one commentator argues that the ban should only apply to the 
pharmaceutical industry.144
  
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 1341. 
 139 See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
 140 See discussion infra Section IV.B. 
 141 See discussion infra Section IV.C. 
 142 See discussion infra Section IV.D. Currently, there is proposed legislation 
in Congress, which would make it per se illegal. Preserve Access to Affordable Ge-
nerics Act, S. 369, 11th Cong. (2009). The Supreme Court, however, has declined the 
opportunity to resolve the issue. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 
(11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006). 
 143 See generally Lisa M. Natter, Note, Infringement Lawsuits: The Continu-
ing Battle Between Patent Law and Antitrust Law in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 18 
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 363 (2006); Keith Leffler & Cristofer Leffler, The Probabil-
istic Nature of Patent Rights: In Response to Kevin McDonald, ANTITRUST, Summer 
2003, at 77. 
 144 Natter, supra note 143, at 381. Natter argues that the per se analysis is 
appropriate because: (1) it would apply only to narrow class of cases, (2) it would 
resolve unclear law regarding these agreements, and (3) it is consistent with the objec-
tives of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Id. 
 This narrow application would be consis-
tent with the objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act both in benefiting 
consumers by facilitating generic entry into the market and in encour-
aging brand-name drug companies to continue to invest in research 
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and new product development.145 Additionally, this rule, while admit-
tedly harsh, would provide clarity to the pharmaceutical industry and 
ultimately reduce costs associated with litigation.146 In response to the 
reduced innovation argument, one commentator has noted that statis-
tics have shown since the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, both 
generic presence in the market and overall investment in research and 
development have increased.147 Thus, because the Act itself has argu-
ably not affected innovation it follows that treating pharmaceutical 
agreements as per se illegal would not likely have a great impact since 
it would be used in a “limited set of circumstances.”148
Others have argued for per se illegality because there is rarely a 
valid justification for using “reverse payments” to settle infringement 
actions.
  
149 Further, in their opinion, these payments are arguably inef-
ficient because a cross-licensing agreement is often the best method to 
approximate the expected conclusion of a patent infringement case, 
and also allows for generic entry into the market.150 This result bene-
fits the consumer as was intended by the Hatch-Waxman Act. How-
ever, the idea of limiting parties’ options during litigation, despite 
some evidence it may not greatly impact the pharmaceutical industry, 
has gained little support with the majority of commentators advocat-
ing a different approach. 151
Per se legal treatment would allow all “reverse payment” settle-
ments so long as the original patent infringement suit was not a 
 
B. Per se Legal Treatment 
  
 145 See id. at 385-87. 
 146 Id. at 384 (arguing that using the rule of reason analysis would increase the 
cost of litigation and may not be properly applied since courts have difficulty untan-
gling the complex economic issues presented in antitrust cases). 
 147 See id. at 386 (indicating that investment in research increased from $2 
billion in 1980 to $39 billion in 2004 and generics increased their market share from 
19% in 1984 to 57% in 2005) (citation omitted). 
 148 Id. (“Applying a per se analysis to reverse payment agreements…would 
unlikely have anywhere near the impact that the Hatch-Waxman Act had on increas-
ing the percentage of generic drugs in the marketplace. It is therefore difficult to 
argue that applying such an analysis in a limited set of circumstances would stifle the 
investment and innovation so critical to the pharmaceutical industry.”). 
 149 See generally Leffler, supra note 143 (providing efficiency arguments to 
demonstrate why the per se approach is appropriate for reverse payment settlements 
in the pharmaceutical industry). 
 150 Id. at 79-80.  
 151 See Ronald W. Davis, Reverse Payment Patent Settlements: A view into 
the Abyss, and a Modest Proposal, 21 ANTITRUST, Fall 2006, at 29 (“[T]here is some 
support among the commentariat for per se illegality, but not very much.”) (citation 
omitted). 
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sham.152 Judge Posner articulated this approach in Asashi Glass stat-
ing that “unless a neutral observer would reasonably think either that 
the patent was almost certain to be declared invalid, or the defendants 
were almost certain to be found not to have infringed it, if the suit 
went to judgment,” the settlement is legal.153 While in support of this 
approach, some commentators recognize that this standard is poten-
tially underinclusive by preventing only the worst abusive settle-
ments.154 For instance, it could “allow[] the patent owner to preserve 
its economic position, possibly for the entire life of the patent, even if 
its chances of prevailing in litigation are substantially less than 50 
percent, as long as the suit is not objectively baseless.”155 However, 
because they fear that an overinclusive standard would negatively 
affect settlements and that having no recognized standard would only 
create more uncertainty, the per se legal approach is the best solution 
available.156 Another supporter of this approach argues that “reverse 
payment” agreements are not themselves anticompetitive because this 
type of payment structure is often necessary to settle these disputes, 
and may ultimately benefit the consumer by facilitating generic entry 
onto the market.157 Despite these arguments in favor of the per se le-
gal approach, most propose an approach that attempts to balance con-
sumer interest and antitrust goals, while recognizing the rights granted 
by a patent.158
  
 152 See Kent S. Barnard & Willard Tom, Antitrust Treatment of Pharmaceuti-
cal Patent Settlements: The Need for Context and Fidelity to First Principles, 15 FED. 
CIR. B.J. 617, 632 (2006) (proposing per se legal approach to reverse payment settle-
ments as long as the agreement is not a “sham settlement”); see also Davis, supra 
note 151, at 28 (noting that the per se legal approach has “scant” support among 
commentators). 
 153 Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 993 (N.D. 
Ill. 2003). Judge Posner did not consider whether this standard applied to the “reverse 
payment” situation because that issue was not before him. However, some commenta-
tors argue that its logic is appropriate in these scenarios. See Barnard & Tom, supra 
note 152, at 633. 
 154 See Barnard & Tom, supra note 152, at 633. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. (“We are better off with a standard that is occasionally underinclusive 
than we are with the chilling effect on patent settlements that comes with either an 
overinclusive standard or the uncertainty bred by the search for a perfect standard.”). 
 157 See Marc G. Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse 
Payment Fallacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1033, 1034 (2004) (arguing that instead of con-
tinued litigation, which is no benefit to the consumer, settlements that split the life of 
the patent allow generics to enter the market prior to the patent’s expiration, which 
ultimately favors the consumer).  
 158 See discussion infra Section IV.C. 
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C. Compromise Between the Two Extremes: The Middle Ground 
To avoid the over- and underinclusiveness inherent in the per se 
approaches, many commentators seek a middle ground that requires a 
more nuanced analysis of patent settlements and the goals of anti-
trust.159 Some argue for a rebuttable presumption of illegality, where 
the settling parties have the burden of showing that these agreements 
do not violate antitrust law since they are in the best position to dem-
onstrate that such payments were reasonable.160 Each commentator, 
however, proffers his own unique set of factors that can overcome the 
presumption of illegality. For example, some suggest that the payment 
size must be limited to “no more than the expected value of litigation 
and collateral costs attending the lawsuit,” in order to be considered 
reasonable.161 The reasoning is that if a patent holder truly believed it 
would prevail in its patent infringement case, it would pay no more 
than the expected cost of litigation to settle.162 If the payment exceeds 
this expectation, the patent holder must have doubts about its patent 
validity or the “defendant’s status as an infringer,”163 therefore the 
payment reflects a socially costly outcome, allowing the patent holder 
to preserve its monopoly even though the patent is probably invalid 
while denying the consumer the benefit of competition.164
One commentator warns against a ceiling on acceptable payments, 
voicing concern over a rule which forces parties “into alternative set-
tlement arrangements [that] might, in some cases, materially affect 
patent owners’ ex ante incentives by reducing the expected payoff 
  
  
 159 See generally Scott A. Backus, Reversing Course on Reverse Payment 
Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Has Schering-plough Created the Blue-
print for Defensible Antitrust Violations? 60 OKLA. L. REV. 375, 410-11 (2007) (dis-
cussing the different positions in the middle ground approach to reverse payments).  
 160 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompe-
titive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1759 
(2003) (arguing that the infringement plaintiff should bear the burden of demonstrat-
ing that the payment was reasonable); Thomas Cotter, Antitrust Implications of a 
Patent Settlements Involving Reverse Payments: Defending a Rebuttable Presumption 
of Illegality in Light of Some Recent Scholarships, 71 ANTITRUST L. J. 1069, 1082 
(2004) (arguing that the settling parties should bear the burden of persuasion on 
whether the settlement was lawful); Carrier, supra note 24, at 76 (arguing that the 
settling parties should have the opportunity to rebut the presumption of illegality). 
 161 Hovenkamp et al., supra note 160, at 1759 (footnote omitted). 
 162 See id. at 1759 n. 177. 
 163 Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 25 
 164 Id.; see also Backus, supra note 159, at 405 (explaining the consumer 
harm from these payments is the difference between what the consumer would gain if 
the patent infringement case was decided and what the consumer receives as a result 
of settlement). 
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from invention.”165 Another argues that there should not be a particu-
lar method of demonstrating the reasonableness of the payment, and 
instead suggests that the defendants can explain their payments sever-
al ways, including that: (1) the generic was cash-strapped; (2) the ge-
neric and the brand-name had “informational asymmetries” about the 
patent; (3) the payment was not larger than litigation costs; (4) other 
reasonable explanations (i.e., reliance on sales projects, market ana-
lyses).166
Ultimately, the aim of these propositions is to bridge the divide 
between courts and commentators, however to achieve this compro-
mise, courts would face greater “administrative costs and decreased 
efficiency due to the requirement for a more thorough investigation of 




In the past, the FTC has only challenged the settlements between 
pharmaceutical companies based on allegations of antitrust viola-
tions.
 With each new proposal, the search continues for a perfect 
solution that properly balances the Hatch-Waxman Act’s goal of in-
creasing generic competition, the exclusionary power granted by a 
patent, and antitrust principles, in the hopes of obtaining the best out-
come for consumers and the pharmaceutical industry. Yet, this debate 
could be avoided if the FTC, in addition to bringing suit against 
pharmaceutical companies for antitrust violations, could attack the 
underlying patent to ensure the settlement was based on a valid patent. 
V. THE FTC SHOULD CHALLENGE THE 
UNDERLYING PATENT’S VALIDITY TO ENFORCE 
THE PUBLIC’S INTEREST IN FREE COMPETITION 
168 Yet considering the ruling in United States v. U.S. Gypsum 
Co. and United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., the FTC has standing to 
challenge the underlying patents involved in these antitrust dis-
putes.169
The concept that the Government itself could have standing in a 
patent validity case was first litigated in United States v. American 
 This would ensure that there would always be at least one 
party who has the ability to challenge the patent and cannot be si-
lenced through payment.  
A. The Government has Standing to Challenge a Patent’s Validity 
  
 165 Cotter, supra note 160, at 1092. 
 166 Carrier, supra note 24, at 76.  
 167 Backus, supra note 159, at 411 (footnotes omitted). 
 168 See discussion supra Section III. 
 169 See discussion infra Section V.A. 
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Bell Telephone Co.170 The Government argued that Bell Telephone 
fraudulently delayed its application in order to extend its monopoly on 
a product that was already in the public domain, or in the alternative, 
that it was not the original inventor and thus, the court should invali-
date the patent.171 Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that the delay 
was not due to the applicant but rather the patent office itself, so there 
was no fraud on part of Bell Telephone.172 The Court did not consider 
the second argument regarding the validity of the patent because it 
ruled that the Government lacked standing to make such a claim.173
The Government is not required to abide by the standing require-
ments that apply to private patent suits “when it has a proprietary and 
pecuniary interest in the result” and “when it is necessary in order to 
enable it to discharge its obligations to the public.”
 
174 Yet in Bell Tel-
ephone, no such interest existed.175 Instead the Court found that the 
Government was “a mere formal complainant in a suit, not for the 
purpose of asserting any public right or protecting any public interest, 
title, or property, but merely to form a conduit through which one 
private person can conduct litigation against another private per-
son….”176 The Government was thereby bound to “the rules govern-
ing…suits between private litigants,”177 which at the time meant that 
only a party charged with infringement could challenge the validity of 
the patent.178 However, the Court explained that the Government 
might have such an interest when prosecuting antitrust violations.179 It 
noted that one of the responsibilities of government is to ensure that 
the public does not endure the evils of a monopoly, especially one 
“wrongfully created” through an invalid patent. The Court refused to 
decide whether this was enough to exempt the Government from the 
standing rules applied in private litigation.180
  
 170 United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224 (1897). 
 171 Id. at 227. 
 172 Id. at 262-63. 
 173 Id. at 265. 
 174 Id. at 264. 
 175 Id. at 265. 
 176 Id. (quoting United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 347 (1888)). 
 177 Id.  
 178 Id. (discussing the limitations on standing imposed by the Court in United 
States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338 (1888)). 
 179 See id. at 266 (discussing when the Government has an obligation to pro-
tect the public against monopolies). 
 180 Id. (citing United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 159 U.S. 548 (1885)).  
 It concluded that review-
ing simple errors committed by the patent office was inappropriate 
and would allow courts to have appellate jurisdiction over the organi-
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zation, which was never authorized or intended by Congress.181
In United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., the Supreme Court was 
asked to decide the question it had previously declined to address in 
United States v. Bell Telephone Co.—whether the government was 
allowed to challenge a patent when the patent holder was accused of 
violating antitrust law.
 Thus, 
the Government had no standing to argue the invalidity of the patent. 
182 In Gypsum, the Government brought suit 
against U.S. Gypsum Company and others, arguing the companies 
had an illegal conspiracy to monopolize trade in gypsum products 
because of various agreements to fix prices on the patented gypsum 
board and unpatented gypsum products.183 After the defendants admit-
ted that the arrangements would be illegal if they did not have a pa-
tent, the Government tried to amend their claim to dispute the patent’s 
validity.184 The lower court did not allow this amendment, ruling the 
Government lacked the standing to challenge the patent.185
The Supreme Court, however, overruled the decision, stating that 
the Government did have standing to challenge the validity of the 
patents.
   
186 Although the Court thought that it was clear that the 
agreements went beyond the scope of the patent and therefore the 
Government’s failed amendment was not dispositive, the Court felt it 
necessary to directly overrule the lower court’s decision concerning 
standing.187 Since a licensee in an antitrust suit can challenge the va-
lidity a patent because of a “public interest in free competition” and 
the Government has the same interest to preserve competition, the 
Court decided that the Government should have the same right to 
challenge a patent’s validity as well.188
The Court further expanded the Government’s ability to challenge 
a patent in United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd. decision.
 
189 In Glaxo, 
two companies decided to pool their various patents concerning the 
antibiotic giriseofulvin, which is used to treat external fungal infec-
tions.190
  
 181 Id. at 269 (“That would be an attempt on the part of the courts in collateral 
attack to exercise an appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the patent office, 
although no appellate jurisdiction has been…conferred.”). 
 182 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948). 
 183 Id. at 367. 
 184 Id. at 386-87. 
 185 Id. at 387. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. at 387-88. 
 188 Id.  
 189 United States v. Glaxo Grp., Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973).  
 190 Id. at 53. 
 They agreed not to sell the product without consent and then 
made various licensing agreements that restricted the resale of the 
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drug as well.191 The Government alleged these restrictions on drug 
sale and resales were in violation of the Sherman Act.192 The Gov-
ernment also challenged the validity one of the patents, but the district 
court struck this argument because the companies did not use the pa-
tents and the legal monopoly granted by them to defend the agree-
ments.193 Even though the district court held that the agreements were 
illegal, the Government still appealed because it was denied the relief 
it requested.194
In its decision, the Supreme Court ruled the Government could 
challenge a patent’s validity even when the patent was not part of a 
defense.
  
195 However, in Glaxo, it was necessary to decide the validity 
of the patent in order to decide whether the Government’s request for 
compulsory licensing and mandatory sales was appropriate.196
we do not recognize unlimited authority in the Government to 
attack a patent by basing an antitrust claim on the simple as-
sertion that the patent is invalid. Nor do we invest the Attor-
ney General with a roving commission to question the validity 
of any patent lurking in the background of an antitrust case.
 There-
fore, the Court noted:  
197
This restriction prevents the Government attacking any patent in-
volved in an antitrust litigation, limiting their challenges to the patent, 
and in particular, the patent’s claims that directly concern the antitrust 
violations.
  
198 Yet, if the antitrust violation is “sufficiently related” to 
the patent, then the Government has the ability to challenge its validi-
ty.199
  
 191 Id. at 54-55. 
 192 Id. at 56 (noting that the district court held that the agreements to be a per 
se violation of the Sherman Act). 
 193 Id.  
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. at 58. 
 196 Id. at 58-59. 
 197 Id. at 59 (citation omitted). 
 198 See United States. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 508 F. Supp. 1157, 1158 n.2 67 
(D.N.J. 1979) (discussing and interpreting standing requirements for challenging a 
patent in the antitrust context). 
 199 Id.  
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B. The FTC Can Challenge the Patent in Pharmaceutical Antitrust 
Cases Because the Pharmaceutical Companies Rely on Their Patents 
to Justify Their Conduct 
While Gypsum and Glaxo were cases prosecuted by the DOJ, this 
should not impact whether the precedent can be extended to suits 
brought by the FTC. Gypsum and Glaxo clearly established that when 
a company relies upon its patents to justify its anticompetitive beha-
vior, the United States is allowed to question the validity of these pa-
tents.200
The FTC has authority under the Federal Trade Commission Act 
(FTC Act) to prevent companies from engaging in “unfair methods of 
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce.”
 In pharmaceutical patent settlements, companies are clearly 
relying on their patents to defend their conduct. Thus, the government 
agency tasked with investigating these settlements and preventing 
unfair competition should be able to question the validity of these 
patents in order to protect consumers from unjust monopolies. 
201 The Supreme Court has inter-
preted the unfairness standard as “encompassing not only practices 
that violate the Sherman Act and other antitrust laws, but also practic-
es that the Commission determines are against public policy for other 
reasons.”202 The only limitation to this broad standard is that once the 
Commission concludes a business practice violates one of these ratio-
nales, “administrative law dictate[s] that its decision must stand or fall 
on that basis, and a reviewing court may not consider other reasons 
why the practice might be deemed unfair.”203
When the FTC challenges “reverse payment” settlements, it has 
always argued that the settlements violate antitrust law, and thus vi-




 200 See discussion supra Section V.A. 
 201 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). 
 202 FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986) (citation omitted); 
see FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1972) (stating that § 5 of 
the FTC Act does not limit the FTC to attacking practices that only violate antitrust 
law). 
 203 Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 455; see Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 
U.S. at 245-50. 
 Since the FTC is challenging these agreements 
under antitrust law governed by the Sherman Act and forcing the de-
fendants to justify their anticompetitive behavior, if the defendant tries 
to defend its actions by invoking its patent rights, then FTC should 
have the opportunity to “show that the asserted shield of patentability 
 204 See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005); 
see also discussion supra Section III.  
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does not exist,” 205 as discussed in Gypsum. Courts have recognized 
this reliance on patents to defend anticompetitive behavior stating, 
“the right of exclusion conferred by a patent has been characterized as 
a defense to an antitrust claim.”206 Gypsum clearly stated that when a 
company relies upon its patents to justify its anticompetitive behavior, 
the Government is allowed to attack the validity of the patents in the 
name of public interest in free competition.207 Companies themselves 
have argued that the FTC needs to consider the exclusionary power 
and not rely solely on the existence and size of the payment when 
arguing against these payments.208
The ability to question the underlying patent in these settlements 
would transform the FTC’s approach in prosecuting “reverse pay-
ment” settlements. If the pharmaceutical companies were required to 
justify their agreements by demonstrating that they were founded on 
valid patents, then the public would be protected from abusive agree-
ments. If the FTC adopted this strategy, it would increase the time and 
resources required to pursue these claims. However, if pharmaceutical 
companies are aware of the risk involved in structuring settlements 
that include “reverse payments,” it is likely that the number of these 
settlements will decrease to avoid the scrutiny of the FTC, ultimately 
reducing the expected burden on the agency. While it has been argued 
this type of payment is a necessary option for companies to consider 
when creating these settlements, this approach could effectively elim-
inate this as an option.
 If these pharmaceutical companies 
wish to defend their behavior solely on the principle that their patents 
grant them the power to exclude, the FTC, as the Government’s repre-
sentative and consumer advocate in these cases, should be able to 
question the validity of the relevant pharmaceutical patent.  
209 Additionally, it is worth noting that because 
the pharmaceutical companies have been required to file settlement 
agreements with the FTC and DOJ, the vast majority of these settle-
ments have not included “reverse payments” to generics.210
  
 205 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 388 (1948).  
 206 Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., 344 F.3d 1294, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 207 Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 387-88. 
 208 See, e.g., Opening Brief of Schering-Plough Corporation at 38-44, Scher-
ing-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (2005) (No. 04-10688-AA), 2004 WL 
3557974. 
 209 See Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F.Supp.2d 986, 994 
(N.D. Ill. 2003).  
 210 See FTC SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS, supra note 7 (indicating that figures 
from fiscal year 2008 show that approximately 70% of final agreements between 
brand-generic companies did not involve payment to the generic).  
 This set-
tlement structure is not the only option available to pharmaceutical 
companies. Although this approach may be seen as a way to under-
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mine the rights granted to a patentee, Congress has recognized the 
public interest in ensuring that only valid patents are issued by stating 
“an issued patent carries only a rebuttable presumption of validity, 
which can be challenged in court.”211
In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, the Supreme Court recognized that there 
are few parties truly capable of challenging a patent and explained the 
negative consequences that would result if these parties were unable 
to do so.
 If the patentee can effectively 
silence any of its potential competitors, the public would be forced to 
endure unwarranted patent monopolies. This approach would not be 
undermining the rights granted to the patentee but rather ensuring that 
these rights were properly granted in the first place. 
C. Lear Supports the Conclusion that the FTC Can Challenge the Pa-
tent’s Validity 
212 The Court was asked to reconsider whether a licensee was 
able to challenge the validity of the licensor’s patent.213 Previously, 
the Court had held under the principle of estoppel that a licensee was 
unable to challenge a patent because as a licensee it would be unfair to 
reap the rewards of a licensed patent but also challenge it.214 In decid-
ing to overrule itself and allow a licensee to challenge a patent’s valid-
ity, the Court considered who really has the ability to make such a 
challenge: “[l]icensees may often be the only individuals with enough 
economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an inventor’s 
discovery. If they are muzzled, the public may continually be required 
to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need or justifica-
tion.”215
The courts today need to revisit Lear’s public policy argument 
and apply it in the context of pharmaceutical settlements, remember-
ing who is best able to act as a guardian of the public interest. Often 
times only generic drug companies are in the position to challenge a 
brand-name’s patent and when brand-names are able to negotiate ge-
nerics’ silence, who is left to make sure we, the public, are not re-
quired to pay “would-be monopolists” for patents that may or may not 
be valid? Considering the FTC is the government agency tasked to 
 
  
 211 In re Ciprofloaxcin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1334 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 212 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). 
 213 Id. at 670. 
 214 Id. at 656; see Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 339 
U.S. 827, 836 (1950) (ruling that the licensee cannot challenge the validity of the 
patents when the licensing agreement does not result in a misuse of patents or a viola-
tion of public policy). 
 215 Lear, 395 U.S. at 670. 
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protect consumers from anticompetitive behavior, courts should have 
no issue allowing the FTC to challenge the validity of the patents in-
volved in “reverse payment” settlements because without their help, 
the public may continue to suffer the high cost of brand-name drugs 
without justification.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Allowing the FTC to challenge the underlying patents completely 
changes the FTC’s ability to attack “reverse payment” agreements. 
While the FTC still needs sufficient evidence to allege an antitrust 
violation in order to shift the burden to the defendants to explain their 
conduct, the FTC can simultaneously question the validity of the pa-
tent if the defendants choose to hide behind the exclusionary power of 
their patents. This approach would allow the FTC to effectively advo-
cate the public’s interest in free competition by ensuring these agree-
ments are founded on valid patents. Without FTC action against 
pharmaceutical patent settlements, the public will be forced to contin-
ue paying higher medical expenses without proper justification. 
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COLLATERAL DAMAGE: INSECURITY 
ASSETS IN THE RISING VIRTUAL AGE 
OF E-COMMERCE 
INTRODUCTION 
Virtual worlds are computer-based, simulated environments that 
incorporate real-world representations of objects into an interface 
where users can interact with one another, typically through the use of 
an “avatar”1 that is graphically visible to other users.2 Virtual worlds 
are “persistent and dynamic” because they exist independent of users’ 
home computers and constantly change even when users are offline.3 
At the forefront of innovative virtual realities is the online application 
Second Life, developed by Linden Labs and launched on June 23, 
2003. In Second Life, a resident assumes the role of an avatar in a 
virtual world where he can personalize his appearance, own property 
and real estate, shop in a virtual economy, operate a storefront, social-
ize with other players, and acquire numerous forms of virtual, intangi-
ble property that has real value.4 To buy land and items in Second 
Life, players can acquire “Lindens,” Second Life’s currency, with 
U.S. dollars.5
  
 1 An “avatar” is defined as: “An on-line, real-time graphical representation 
of an interactive computer service user visible to other users accessing (or sharing) 
the same virtual three-dimensional world. Depending on its implementation, an Ava-
tar may communicate by a combination of body movements (such as walking, gestur-
ing and making facial expressions), text and speech, all of which may be seen and 
heard by other occupants of the virtual world. Avatars may grasp, possess and ex-
change objects with other Avatars and entities within the virtual world.” Steven 
Hetcher, Virtual China, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 469, 473 n. 21 (2008) 
(quoting 2 RICHARD RAYSMAN ET AL., EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES & THE LAW: FORMS 
& ANALYSIS APP. E. (2008)). 
 2 Ned Kock, E-Collaboration and E-Commerce in Virtual Worlds: The 
Potential of Second Life and World of Warcraft, 4 INT’L J. E-COLLABORATION, Jul.-
Sept. 2008, at 1 (discussing the emergence of virtual worlds used for entertainment 
and business purposes). 
 3 Juliet M. Moringiello, What Virtual Worlds Can Do for Property Law, 62 
FLA. L. REV. 159, 169 (2010) [hereinafter Moringiello, Virtual Worlds]. 
 4 What is Second Life?, SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/whatis  
(last visited Oct. 21, 2010). 
 5 Id. 
 Second Life, unlike its predecessors, is a “non-scripted” 
world in which users design content and transform the virtual world 
